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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
ADmIRALTY-APPLICABILITY Or FEDERAL LAw-DoCKOWNER'S LIABILITY
FOR DEATH OF LONGSHOREAN.-The plaintiff while employed in unloading
coal from a vessel docked at Superior Way, Wisconsin, was struck by a
clam-shell and killed. Held, recovery for wrongful death is controlled by
Federal statutes and not the State compensation act, because the unloading
of a ship is not a matter of local concern, but of direct relation to commerce
and navigation. Northern Coal & Dock Company v. Strand (1928), 49 S.
Ct. 88, 73 L. Ed. 99.
The questions involved in the case have had a curious history. In 1917
the famous case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 202, was decided
by a divided court. A stevedore was killed in the performance of his work,
and the court held that the death statute of the state was not applicable. The
employment was declared to be maritime in its nature and the maritime law
applicable. This gave the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to apply
Federal maritime law. Mr. Justice Holmes dissented; he questioned the
existence of a Federal maritime law, denying that there was such "a brood-
ing omnipresence in the sky" which could be applied in preference to the
articulate voice of legislation.
Originally maritime law offered no remedy for wrongful death, and then
the Supreme Court permitted recovery under state death statutes in order
to supplement the maritime law. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia (1921), 257
U. S. 233. Where the matter was purely local, the court has permitted the
state compensation statutes to be treated as modifying and complementing
the maritime law, distinguishing the situation from that of the Jensen case,
supra. Grant-Smith Porter Co. v. Rhode (1921), 257 U. S. 469; Miller's
Indemnity Underwriters v. Brand (1925), 270 U. S. 59.
The final steps in the maritime law giving a right of action for wrongful
death were the Jones Act (1920), 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. sec. 688, the
ruling in Panama R. Co. v. Johnson (1924), 264 U. S. 375, which amended
the act to incorporate the Federal Employer's Liability Act into the mari-
time law of the United States. See Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra.
The work of longshoremen has previously been held to be within the ju-
risdiction of the maritime law. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty
(1926), 272 U. S. 50. But the court distinguishes unloading a ship from
building one (Grant-Smith Porter Co. v. Rhodes, supra) and from sea diving
(Miller's Indemnity Underwriters v. Brand, supra) where it has held those
occupations to be local matters. Precisely how the court reaches the conclu-
sion in this case that the work is not of a local nature is not explained.
Where the court will draw the line in subsequent cases is a matter for
speculation. M. E. C., '29.
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